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Abstract: 
Some of the most widely expressed myths about the German financial system are concerned 
with the alleged close ties and intensive interaction between banks and firms (often described 
as Hausbank relationships). Observers have stressed that bank-firm relationships in Germany 
are not only characterized by long-term debt financing commitments but also by a multitude 
of links. These include direct shareholdings, board representation, and proxy voting and are 
particularly significant for corporate governance. Specifically, it is often argued that close ties 
between banks and borrowers promote investment and improve the performance of firms. 
Second, German universal banks are believed to play a special role as large and informed in-
vestors (shareholders). However, for the very same reasons, German universal banks are fre-
quently accused of abusing their influence on firms by exploiting rents and sustaining the en-
trenchment of firms against efficient transfers of firm control. 
In this paper, we review recent empirical evidence regarding the special role of banks for the 
corporate governance of German firms. We differentiate large and exchange-listed firms ver-
sus small and medium sized companies throughout. While the evidence is not that clear-cut in 
promoting a beneficial role of banks for large firms, most of the recent evidence regarding 
small firms suggests that a Hausbank relationship can indeed be beneficial.  
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1  Myth and Motivation 
 
 
 
 
 
Some of the most widely expressed myths about the German financial system are concerned 
with the alleged close ties and intensive interaction between banks and firms. Observers have 
stressed that bank-firm relationships in Germany are not only characterized by long-term debt 
financing commitments but also by a multitude of links. These include direct shareholdings, 
board representation, and proxy voting and are particularly significant for corporate govern-
ance. Specifically, it is often argued that bank involvement in the supply of capital and in cor-
porate governance may be economically beneficial for two reasons. First, close ties between 
banks and borrowers are perceived to promote investment and improve the performance of 
firms. Second, owing to direct equity holdings, board representation, and proxy-voting rights, 
German universal banks are believed to play a special role as large and informed investors 
(shareholders). However, it is also for the very same reasons that German universal banks are 
frequently accused of abusing their influence on firms, thereby exploiting rents and sustaining 
the entrenchment of firms against efficient transfers of firm control. 
In order to understand the financial system in Germany properly, a distinction has to be made 
between the relatively small group of large, publicly traded corporations on the one hand, and 
the small and medium-sized companies on the other. The vast majority of corporate Germany, 
both in terms of numbers and sales, has private equity, and bank involvement is neither in the 
function of shareholders, nor as proxy voters or board members, but usually just as lenders. 
However, for these firms, bank debt is the single most important source of outside financing, 
which in turn implies a major role for banks.  
„[T]here are good reasons to choose the German 
rather than the British style of capital markets...In 
practice, the effectiveness of German banks as 
monitors of company performance ... makes the 
German system unambigously superior.“ 
CRAFTS (1992), p. 409 
„The commonly-held view of the merits of 
the German system of finance for invest-
ment, in terms of the supply of external 
finance to firms and corporate control, 
receives no support from the analysis of 
available evidence.“  
EDWARDS/FISCHER (1994), p. 240   2
In this chapter we will discuss the role of banks for both groups of corporations, focusing on 
the information-intensive long-term relationships between banks and firms, often referred to 
as “Hausbank” (henceforth: housebank) financing. Within such housebank relationships, 
banks are said to be the primary financier, being equipped with more relevant, and more 
timely information than any other external investor (like, for example, an outside bank). 
Moreover, housebanks are deemed to accept a special responsibility in the event that borrow-
ers should face financial distress. It is this housebank notion which implicitly underlies the 
supposed merits of bank-firm relationships mentioned above, and it is often used to describe 
the role of banks for all segments of firms. However, as indicated by the above statements of 
Crafts (1992) and Edwards/Fischer (1994), these merits are contended.  
The objective of this chapter is to present and discuss recent evidence to provide a clearer 
picture of the economic role of housebanks. Section 2 will start to look at the role of German 
banks for large and exchange-listed firms, abstracting from lending for a moment. Banks are 
seen as investors, with a role in corporate control and governance. This section will discuss 
recent evidence on the effect of bank influence on firms (or firm management), focussing on 
financing constraints and corporate performance.  
The implications of banks for corporate governance in section 2 apply to an exclusive circle 
of large, mostly public firms only, and they can by no means be easily generalized to apply to 
all of corporate Germany (see chapters 2 and 3 in this book for a detailed account). Therefore, 
the subsequent sections turn to the lending business with regard to small and medium-sized 
firms. In section 3, a brief outline of the theoretical notion of relationship lending will be pro-
vided. The next sections present the available evidence. In section 4, the idea of intertemporal 
smoothing as an essential characteristic of implicit long-term contracts between firms and 
banks will be analyzed. In section 5, the decision-making process of banks when their bor-
rowers face financial distress is addressed. We will briefly describe the present legal practice 
concerning financial distress in Germany, including a short description of the insolvency 
code. The role of housebanks and the institution of bank pools will be analyzed by discussing 
recent studies using unique data on medium-sized corporate borrowers. Section 6 summarizes 
and concludes.  
 
   3
2  Universal Banks as Financiers of Large Companies: Equity Stakes and Proxy Voting 
2.1 Overview 
In early works by Hilferding (1909), and later Schumpeter (1939) and Gerschenkron (1962), 
the interaction between industrial firms and universal banks was presumed to have been of 
great importance for the industrialization of Germany in the 19
th century, and only recently 
the economics of financial system architecture have once more become an active field of re-
search (see Tilly 1992, La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, Rajan/Zingales 2001). In this context a dis-
tinction is generally made between two polar cases of financial systems with market-based 
financial systems, such as the US or UK, on the one hand and  bank-based systems, like Japan 
and Germany, on the other. 
This section explores the benefits of banking relationships for large publicly-traded firms in 
Germany. The German financial system differs from US-type financial systems in that Ger-
man universal banks not only are allowed to take direct equity stakes, but are often repre-
sented on the supervisory board of industrial firms and possess additional influence via proxy-
voting rights. All of these characteristics are thought to be significant in terms of their poten-
tial to influence the decisions taken at the company level. Hence corporate governance in 
Germany is said to be bank-dominated (Emmons/Schmid 1998, p. 20, and chapter 2 in this 
book), and the question whether this is beneficial or detrimental in terms of overall social wel-
fare is subject to debate. Cable (1985, p. 130), for example, on the basis of his empirical 
analysis concludes: “it is clear from the results, that the relationship between industrial bank-
ing and firm performance has more to it than the provision of credit alone; it is bank control 
as well as bank lending which raises profitability.“ In contrast, Fohlin (1998, p. 1755) con-
cludes as a result of her analysis that “the results undermine widely held beliefs about the 
benefits of universal banking...” 
The conflicting empirical evidence on the role of banks for large firms can be attributed to the 
two approaches taken. Both approaches address the core question of corporate finance: does 
the financing choice of firms affect investment and therefore have real consequences? The 
first approach is concerned with bank influence and its impact on the performance of firms. In 
this class of studies, a measure of firm performance, e.g. the return on assets, is statistically 
related to a measure of bank dependence.    4
The second approach relates firm investment expenditures to a measure of internal and exter-
nal financing (and future investment opportunities). The basic idea is that the existence of 
financing constraints leads firms to choose among financing sources according to a specific 
preference ranking. In particular, capital market imperfections lead to a preference for internal 
over external financing (see Fazzari/Hubbard/Petersen 1988, Kaplan/Zingales 1997). Fur-
thermore, it is postulated that firms subject to tighter financing constraints will exhibit  greater 
cash-flow sensitivity with respect to investments. Under this hypothesis, a certain degree of 
bank dependence on the part of a firm should mitigate financing constraints, since, in theory, 
banks reduce information asymmetries and have proper incentives for management control 
(see e.g. Houston/James 2001).  
We provide some descriptive evidence on the long-term relationship between large, listed 
firms and universal banks in Germany in the next sub-section.  
 
2.2  Descriptive Evidence on Equity Holdings, Supervisory Board Representation, and the 
Proxy-Voting Rights of Banks 
It is useful to start with a brief description of the governing bodies of a German stock ex-
change-listed corporation (Aktiengesellschaft, AG). The AG has three governing bodies: the 
annual general meeting (Hauptversammlung), a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and a man-
aging board (Vorstand). The supervisory board and the managing board are separated with 
respect to personnel. The supervisory board must have a pre-specified number of employee 
representatives as members (co-determination, Mitbestimmung). It is quite common for 
boards of affiliated firms to share several members. Typically some managers of the parent 
company are also members of a subsidiary's supervisory board.1 The supervisory board often 
includes representatives of a firm's banks, which then usually have a tradition of debt provi-
sion and may have equity stakes in the firm. Shareholders elect half of the members of the 
supervisory board and their control rights are effectively confined to the general meeting (see 
Spindler, this volume, for details).  
                                                 
1   See Boehmer (1999) for a more detailed overview and references.   5
Unlike in the US, it is quite common in Germany  for there to be significant blockholdings. 
Franks/Mayer (2001) and Boehmer (2001) provide evidence that for all listed firms over the 
period 1985 to 1997 roughly 85% of the firms had a blockholder with a stake above 25%, 
whilst 57% had one with a stake above 50%. In some cases these blockholders are from the 
financial sector, but more often they are firms from the same or different industries and 
wealthy families.   
It is also relevant in a discussion of bank-firm relationships to note that until quite recently 
(Nowak, this volume) deviations from share ownership and voting rights (i.e. control) oc-
curred quite easily under German law. The German proxy-voting system allows shareholders 
to deposit their shares with banks, and grants them general power of attorney. The resulting 
additional voting power for the banks is presumed to be significant. For example, 
Baums/Fraune (1995) provide evidence on the situation regarding large German firms with a 
dispersed ownership structure in 1992. In their sample, banks held on average 13% of effec-
tive voting rights at the general meeting due to direct equity holdings, and 61% due to proxy-
voting rights. Hence, if banks have mutual interest and coordinate their actions, their influ-
ence on management is potentially very great. However, evidence on proxy-voting rights by 
banks is scarce since the data is not centrally (or even electronically) accessible.2  
For the descriptive purposes of this subsection, table 1 presents statistics on bank influence 
rights reported by Seger (1997). However, some caution is due since it is widely believed that 
bank influence rights have decreased in importance since 1990, the observation period under-
lying the data.  
                                                 
2   Exercised proxy-voting rights are documented publicly. However, there does not exist a centralized register 
or an electronic database for assessing this information, see Boehmer (1999). To this end, one has to ad-
dress the local inferior courts at the registered seat of the firms to examine the mandatory minutes of the 
general meetings.   6
Table 1: Measures of Bank Influence Rights 
 Mean  =0%  25%   50%  Number of 
Observations
Share of bank debt in total 
firm financing 
17.1% n.a.  25.0%  n.a.  144 
Supervisory Board Represen-
tation (Dummy) by banks 
70.1% 29.9  %  ---  ---  144 
Share of bank representatives 
in board members represent-
ing capital  
--- 29.9%  41.6%  9.7% 144 
Firms with direct equity hold-
ings by banks 
24.3 %  75.7%  8.3%  2.1%  144 
Proxy-voting rights of banks 
at general meetings 
29.5% n.a.  41.5%  20.0%  65 
Total Voting Rights at General 
Meetings by banks 
37.9% n.a.  49.2%  35.4%  65 
The underlying sample consists of 144 large German firms from manufacturing industries. Information on proxy-
votes were collected from mandatory minutes of general meetings in 1990 and were available for a sub-sample of 
65 firms. 
Source: Own calculations based on numbers reported by Seger (1997), Tables 25-39.  
 
The first point to note is that the numbers shown in table 1 are in line with the general pattern 
described above. Some interesting additional insights become obvious:   
 Supervisory Board: 70% of all sample firms have a bank representative as a member of 
the supervisory board, and in 41.6% of all cases, bank representatives constitute more than 
25% of board members representing capital (i.e., excluding co-determination).3 
 Direct Equity Holdings: The numbers imply that to some extent the relevance of direct 
equity holdings is exaggerated in the public debate, since banks actually hold such stakes 
in approximately only 25% of all cases. Nevertheless, for 8% of the sample firms these 
stakes are equal to or higher than 25% of capital (i.e. a blocking minority, Sperrminorität), 
enabling the respective bank to block all fundamental votes at the general meeting (i.e. 
those that change a firm’s statutes). 
                                                 
3   Note that German legislation requires a mandatory share of representatives of employees in the supervisory 
board (Mitbestimmung). Depending on firm size, this amounts to up to 50% of all members.   7
 Proxy-Voting Rights: The sample mean of proxy-votes at general meetings is in excess of 
a blocking minority with roughly 30%, and in 41.5% of all cases the (aggregate) proxy-
votes of all banks exceed 25%. Adding proxy-votes and direct equity stakes shows that 
banks had a majority of votes at 35.4% of general meetings. 
Although these numbers would appear to provide strong support for the idea of close ties be-
tween large industrial firms and banks in Germany, some words of caution are due. It has to 
be kept in mind that these numbers are aggregated over all banks for a given firm. However,  
to effectively block, for example, a change in a firm's statutes, all banks have to agree on a 
mutual strategy and coordinate their actions. It is very likely that coordination failures and 
free-rider problems will reduce the effective power of banks significantly, thus rendering im-
possible a qualitative comparison  to a situation where just one bank (or investor) may exer-
cise the same nominal magnitude of influence rights. This appears to be particularly important 
for proxy-votes, where it is often the case that several banks are present at the general meet-
ing.   
 
2.3   Universal Banks and Firm Performance: Empirical Findings 
Having established that German universal banks may exert significant influence on the man-
agement of large German firms, the question arises whether this is economically beneficial or 
detrimental. One way of addressing this issue is to test whether bank dependence of a firm 
systematically affects firm performance. Cable (1985) provided the first paper to report such a 
test with German company data. Since the results of Cable were based on a rather small cross-
section of firms, subsequent studies have extended the analysis, using larger data sets, and 
more sophisticated methodologies (see Gorton/Schmid 2000 and Seger 1997). 
There are at least two important issues which cause such an approach to be quite complex. 
First, the analysis of firm performance is a dynamic issue. However, company panel data cov-
ering a time-period of ten or more years are hard to collect, especially if data on voting rights 
of banks are needed. Second, and more importantly, there is no unambiguous theoretical hy-
pothesis relating bank influence rights to firm performance. On the one hand, bank depend-
ence may simply be seen as synonymous for the bargaining power of banks, allowing them to   8
extract rents. This would imply a negative impact on firm performance.4 On the other hand, 
bank dependence may be interpreted as resolving problems of informational asymmetries and 
incomplete contracting. This second view supports the hypothesis that  firms which exhibit 
greater bank dependence will perform better (see Gorton/Schmid 2000).  
Under both hypotheses, however, it is hard to explain why some firms rely on bank debt and 
some do not. If, for example, bank dependence is beneficial, why do some firms prefer not to 
have such close bank relationships? Following Demsetz/Lehn (1985), one answer to that 
question might be that firms choose that financing structure which is optimal to their individ-
ual needs. This would imply that firms in need of bank monitoring are bank dependent, and 
those that are not are independent. Hence, empirically, an equilibrium situation is observed 
where we do not expect to find any systematic differences in firm performance, since firms 
relying on banks are as profitable as those without bank dependence, just because they have 
already chosen to allow for bank monitoring. 
Therefore, empirical analyses of the relation between bank dependence and firm performance 
suffer from problems of data availability and ambiguity in theoretical guidance. Nevertheless, 
an inductive approach may still be helpful in identifying any dominant patterns. 
Table 2 summarizes a selection of recent studies addressing the relation between bank de-
pendence and firm performance.5 The table provides information on the structure and size of 
the underlying firm sample of all studies. In addition, the measures used for bank dependence 
and firm performance are provided, as well as a summary of the results. 
                                                 
4   See e.g. Weinstein/Yafeh (1998) for a corresponding model and empirical analysis with respect to Japanese 
firms, where firms and (main) banks constitute a so-called keiretsu. 
5   For ease of exposition, we refrain from giving a complete overview. Our selection comprises the most re-
cent and comprehensive studies.   9
Table 2: Studies on Bank Dependence, Firm Investment and Profitability for German Firms 
Study Seger  (1997)  Lehmann/Weigand 
(2000) 
Gorton/Schmid 
(2000) 
Elston (1998)  Fohlin (1998) 
Panel A: General Characteristics 
Observation 
Period 
1990-1992 1992-1996  1975  /  1986  1973-1984  1903-1913 
Sample Size  144  361  283 / 280   139  75 
Industry Affilia-
tion 
non-financial, 
manufacturing 
manufacturing manufacturing  manufacturing non-financial 
Performance-
Measure 
ROA, ROE and 
others 
ROA market-to-book 
value of equity, 
ROE 
(cash-flow sensi-
tivity of invest-
ment) 
(cash-flow 
sensitivity of 
investment) 
Measure of 
Bank Depend-
ence  
debt share, equity 
stakes, supervisory 
board, proxy vot-
ing 
equity stake  equity stakes, 
proxy voting,  
direct bank eq-
uity stake 
cross director-
ate membership
Information on 
Proxy-Votes  
yes, sub-sample of 
firms 
no yes,  sub-
sample of firms
No --- 
Panel B: Results: Impact of bank dependence measure on firm performance  
Bank Debt Fi-
nancing  
negative ---  --- --- --- 
Equity Control 
Rights  
positive positive  positive ---  --- 
Supervisory 
Board 
Representation 
negative  insignificant  --- --- --- 
Panel C: Results: Impact of bank dependence measure on investment / cash-flow correlation 
Supervisory 
Board 
---  ---  ---    unstable / in-
significant 
Equity Control 
Rights 
--- ---  ---  negative   
Note: ROE and ROA denote return on equity and return on assets, respectively. 
 
The table shows some heterogeneity in these studies in terms of the underlying firm samples 
and available information. Nevertheless, the results are broadly consistent across studies.  
We first turn to the relation between direct equity holdings by banks and firm performance. 
Gorton/Schmid (2000) consider two measures of bank influence: direct shareholdings, and 
proxy-voting rights. Their empirical model further tests for co-determination of employees, 
and overall shareholder concentration. Performance is measured either as the market-to-book 
value of equity or as the return on equity. It turns out that bank control has a positive impact   10
on firm performance, similar to the effect of blockholdings by non-financial investors. By 
controlling for both issues simultaneously, the authors find that direct shareholdings by banks 
improves firm performance beyond the level achieved by non-bank blockholders. The authors 
suggest that this superior control effect of banks is owing to either better information and su-
perior expertise, or because of the additional threat to cut-off debt financing if the manage-
ment refuses to comply with bank interests.  
These results are consistent with the findings by Lehmann/Weigand (2000) and Seger (1997), 
who also report better firm performance for more highly concentrated shareholder structures 
and equity holdings by banks. Note that the data of Lehmann/Weigand (2000) is more recent.  
With regard to the impact of proxy-voting rights on firm performance, neither Gorton/Schmid 
(2000) nor Seger (1997) find evidence that these are used to exert management control. Gor-
ton/Schmid (2000) suggest this insignificance may be due to the fact that proxy-voting rights 
merely reflect the degree of dispersion of shareholdings. That is, the lower the shareholder 
concentration, the higher will be the level of proxy-votes, since these arise from the delega-
tion of voting rights to banks by small and non-pivotal investors. This characteristic of proxy-
votes might be due to the inherently high coordination problems associated with the exercis-
ing of such votes.  
The relation between supervisory board representation by banks and firm performance is ad-
dressed by all three studies. Seger (1997) and Lehmann/Weigand (2000) consistently find no 
impact of board representation on firm performance. One corresponding explanation is pro-
vided by Gorton/Schmid (2000). They argue that membership on a supervisory board is de-
rived from equity control rights. Their conjecture is supported by a regression analysis, indi-
cating that board membership is systematically determined by equity holdings. 
To summarize, it can be said that recent studies provide consistent evidence suggesting a 
beneficial role of direct equity stakes held by banks. Hence, there is some support for the con-
jecture that banks play a special role in the process of corporate governance in Germany. With 
respect to alternative means to exerting management control, i.e. proxy-voting rights and su-
pervisory board representation, the evidence seems in general to imply the irrelevance of 
these factors. This is somewhat surprising in view of the common perception that proxy votes 
provide banks with a significant and frequently criticized amount of influence rights (e.g.,   11
Jürgens/Rupp/Vitols 2000). However, when the coordination problems inherent in a strategic 
exercise of proxy-votes are taken into account, this would appear to be a reasonable finding. 
 
2.4  Banks, Liquidity, and Financing Constraints 
The second approach to analyzing the economic consequences of close ties between banks 
and large industrial firms is concerned with the ability of banks to mitigate the financing con-
straints of firms.  
In a seminal study, Fazzari/Hubbard/Petersen (1988) argued that capital market imperfections 
lead to firm preferences for internal over external sources of financing, and that this can be 
analyzed by regressing firm investment expenditures on a measure of internal financing and 
investment opportunities.6 In a perfect Modigliani/Miller world, all investment projects with 
positive net present value will be financed, thus rendering the choice of funding irrelevant. In 
such a world, firm expenditures should not depend on the availability of internally generated 
funds. Hence, a regression of investment expenditures on cash-flow should yield no system-
atic relation, having controlled for future investment opportunities. According to Faz-
zari/Hubbard/Petersen (1988), however, if capital market imperfections are present there 
should be a positive correlation between firm investment and cash flow, which would indicate 
the severity of financing constraints.7 
Under the assumption that banks are able to mitigate financing constraints because of their 
role as active monitors of firm management, a negative impact of firms bank dependence on 
the cash-flow correlation of investments is to be expected(Fohlin 1998, Houston/James 2001). 
This holds in particular for an analysis of German firms, as highlighted by the statement of 
Fohlin (1998, p. 1737): “[German universal banks] are thought to foster long-term relation-
ships with industrial firms, promoting more efficient and stronger investment.“  
                                                 
6   Usually, a proxy for Tobin’s Q is used as the measure for future investment opportunities.  
7   Note, that Kaplan/Zingales (1997) show that observing a positive investment-cash flow correlation is not a 
sufficient condition for the existence of financing constraints. The same correlation pattern may be induced 
by managerial risk aversion or other types of agency problems in the spirit of Jensen’s “free cash-flow” 
problem. See also the general and comprehensive discussion of this research approach by Hubbard (1998).   12
International evidence consistently reports a strong (positive) correlation between cash-flow 
and investment. This also holds for Germany, as for example recently reported by Plötscher 
(2001). Unfortunately, we are aware of only two corresponding studies which take into ac-
count bank dependence of German firms. 
The study by Elston (1998) investigates the impact of bank dependence on firm investment 
expenditures by analyzing a sample of 139 German manufacturing firms (see table 2). She 
estimates cash-flow sensitivities over the period from 1973-1984 for two sub-samples: one 
consisting of 26 firms were banks had a high direct equity stake in the firms, and one where 
no equity stakes were reported.8 The estimation results indicate that bank dependence miti-
gates financing constraints. The reported coefficients of cash-flow sensitivities are positive 
and significant, and they are significantly lower for the sub-sample of firms classified as bank 
dependent.  
The study by Fohlin (1998) analyzes a sample of firms over the period 1903-1913, shifting 
the focus to Germany’s late period of industrialization. The general characteristics of this 
study and its results are reported in table 2. Fohlin (1998) measures bank dependence by 
cross-directorates between firms and banks, i.e., cases where the bank is represented in either 
the executive or supervisory board of the firm, or the firm is represented in the bank's execu-
tive or supervisory board. The results from different model specifications neither suggest that 
bank dependence systematically affects firm investments in terms of its level, nor investment 
correlation with cash-flow.  
This finding may be due to Fohlin’s (1998) use of a very specific type of measure for bank 
dependence (cross-directorates), which raises some doubts concerning its validity as a proxy 
for dependence. However, since the preceding section showed that nowadays supervisory 
board representation is systematically correlated to direct equity stakes (and proxy-votes) , 
Fohlin’s results do indeed cast some doubt on there being a special role of banks for corporate 
governance in Germany. It could be expected that a mitigating effect of bank dependence on 
financial constraints would be most pronounced for the early stage of industrialization. 
                                                 
8   There were only weak disclosure rules regarding equity holdings by banks in place during this period, so 
that the group of firms classified as having no bank relationship might be measured with noise.   13
The empirical findings reported so far are inconclusive. Studies concerned with the impact of 
a firm’s bank dependence on performance consistently find a positive impact of direct equity 
holdings by banks. In contrast, proxy-voting rights and supervisory board representation by 
banks appear to be irrelevant for management control.9 Studies on the ability of banks to miti-
gate financing constraints of firms yield conflicting results, which may be attributed to differ-
ences in the underlying observation periods, or the definition of bank dependence. All studies 
reported so far have focused on large, exchange-listed companies. Note that firms in this size 
segment differ considerably from the vast majority of firms in Germany’s industrial sector. 
Small and medium-sized firms, representing the majority of companies in terms of number 
and GDP-contribution, are subject to less stringent disclosure rules, are not followed by fi-
nancial analysts, and are less likely to possess a publicly observable track record. Therefore, 
for SME companies, problems of informational asymmetries and incomplete contracting tend 
to be more important, thus lending  more weight to the effect of relationships between banks 
and firms. We will discuss the value of relationships in the remaining sections of this chapter, 
emphasizing in particular the notions of the housebank and relationship lending. 
 
3  Banks as Financiers of Small and Medium Enterprises: Lending Relationships  
3.1   The Housebank Concept and Relationship Lending  
In turning to small and medium-sized firms there is a shift in focus to the key economic func-
tion of banks, i.e., their role as providers of external debt. Although we more or less ignored 
debt provision in the preceding section, it is a stylized fact that bank debt is the single most 
important source of external funding for corporations in Germany, as well as in many other 
countries (see Hackethal, this volume, and Fischer/Pfeil, this volume, for further evidence). 
When non-listed firms are taken into consideration, the relevance of bank debt as a financing 
source becomes even greater, whereas the role of bank debt as a means of bank influence via 
direct equity holdings, supervisory board representation, and proxy-voting rights can easily be 
                                                 
9   This does not, of course, imply that supervisory board membership cannot provide valuable information for 
banks. The argument is that all benefits are primarily caused by equity holdings.   14
ignored. The reason is that these latter aspects are irrelevant for small and medium enterprises 
owing to their legal form and the complete absence of public equity.10 
As outlined above, the German notion of the housebank serves as a prime example of close 
ties between bank and firms, in particular if the lending function of banks is addressed. The 
housebank is regarded as the premier lender of a firm with more intensive and more timely 
information than a comparable arm’s-length bank (see e.g. Edwards/Fischer 1994, El-
sas/Krahnen 1998). The housebank is further said to bear a "special responsibility" in the 
event that its borrowers face financial distress.  
At first glance the economic rationale for “a special responsibility” of a bank would appear 
unclear. The theoretical concept of relationship lending, however, provides such a rationale. 
Relationship lending is defined as a long-term implicit contract between a bank and its 
debtor.11 Due to information acquisition and repeated interaction with the borrower over time, 
the housebank accumulates private information. This information privilege commits both par-
ties to one another forging close ties between the bank and the borrower. The definition of 
Petersen/Rajan (1995) highlights the similarities between relationship lending and the house-
bank notion: “by close and continued interaction, a firm may provide a lender with sufficient 
information about, and a voice in, a firm’s affairs so as to lower the cost of and increase the 
availability of credit.”12  
Following Boot (2000), three major potential benefits attributed to relationship lending can be 
summarized: 13  
                                                 
10   Note that in terms of contribution to GDP, the essential part of German firms have the legal form of a lim-
ited liability company (GmbH) or a limited partnership (KG). For the latter,  a GmbH is usually the limited 
partner (GmbH & Co KG), thereby resembling incorporation of the firm. Based on the German tax income 
report, incorporated enterprises and partnerships (including the GmbH & Co KG)  constitute approximately 
one third of all firms in terms of numbers, while two thirds are sole proprietorships. See Deutsche Bundes-
bank (2001). 
11   For recent surveys on the theoretical concept of relationship lending and the respective international evi-
dence, see Ongena/Smith (2000) and Boot (2000). 
12   Petersen/Rajan (1995), p. 6. 
13   Note that event studies based on US data clearly indicate that established relationships are of value. James 
(1987), Lummer/McConnell (1989), and Billett et al. (1995) provide evidence on abnormal returns of bank 
loan announcements to firms. Slovin et al. (1993) complement this evidence by their finding that firm mar-
ket value decreases if a lending bank goes bankrupt, i.e., when the accumulated information capital of the 
bank is destroyed.   15
 Information: A close relationship to its bank might induce a borrower to reveal more in-
formation than in arm’s-length financing (see Bhattacharya/Chiesa 1995, Yosha 1995). In 
turn, a relationship lender might have stronger incentives for information acquisition, and 
may learn from the repeated interaction with the borrower (see Caminal/Matutes 1997,  
Hackethal 2000, and Greenbaum/Thakor 1995). 
 Renegotiation: Relationship lending is an implicit contract, allowing for contractual flexi-
bility through the renegotiation of terms (see Boot/Greenbaum/Thakor 1993).  
 Intertemporal interaction: Commitment between the borrower and the bank allows for 
intertemporal transfers because it introduces a long-term perspective for the bank. If the 
borrower cannot switch to another financier easily, then the bank can expect to earn rents 
in future periods. These rents may in turn offset losses at other stages of the business (see 
e.g. Sharpe 1990, Petersen/Rajan 1995, Allen/Gale 1999).  
All of these benefits have implications for two crucial issues: credit availability in general, 
and credit availability when borrowers face financial distress (i.e., credit availability in a nar-
row sense). As emphasized by Petersen/Rajan (1995) and Fischer (1990), the possibility of 
subsidizing firms in the beginning of a relationship can mitigate problems of moral hazard 
and adverse selection, which would have prohibited loan provision from arm’s-length lend-
ers.14 Hence relationship lending may increase credit availability. 
Financial distress is related to credit availability and of particular importance for our  analysis 
of German housebanks, since these are described as bearing “a special responsibility” towards 
their distressed borrowers. Financial distress characterizes a situation where firms are not able 
to meet current obligations and need liquidity at short notice. In a such a situation, the long-
term perspective of the relationship lender, its information privilege and the switching cost of 
financing can lead to different decisions by banks with respect to the crucial question of de-
nial (i.e. termination) or continuation of debt provision.  
If a bank has private and presumably better information on a borrower's current and future 
economic prospects, it will in general make different decisions in times when the borrower 
faces financial distress. In this situation, lenders have to decide whether to continue debt pro-
                                                 
14   See Berlin/Mester (1999) for an analysis of the importance of intertemporal transfers on loan pricing.   16
vision (or even increase their loan supply to bail the borrower out of the crises) or to terminate 
the credit relationship (which often terminates firm operations, too). To this end, lenders must 
assess whether the crisis is temporary or permanent, i.e., whether or not the underlying in-
vestment projects of the borrowing firm are efficient, and whether or not default is strategic 
(Bolton/Scharfstein 1996). If the borrower still has investments with a positive net present 
value, the efficient decision is a workout and, thus, in favor of a continuation of the relation-
ship. If the borrower’s projects are of poor quality, however, termination would be efficient. 
Of course, efficiency does not necessarily predict actual lender behavior. But, if relationship 
lenders have better (e.g., in the sense of more precise) information on the borrowing firm, 
they will make more efficient decisions, that is, be more  likely to terminate if the borrower is 
bad and more likely to continue financing if the borrower is good. This can be interpreted as a 
kind of distress insurance, where the borrower chooses relationship lending ex ante as a form 
of financing that provides for more efficient bank decision-making in financial distress  
It is important to stress the point that such an insurance does not imply that relationship lend-
ers (or synonymously, housebanks) always decide for continuation or a workout. Rather, it 
can be expected that they will more often decide in favor of the efficient alternative. In fact, 
economically, relationship lending can sometimes be interpreted as a commitment device for 
the borrower to ensure ex-ante that he will be liquidated if distress occurs, since this ex-ante 
decision restricts his later actions in a desirable way (see Rajan 1992 analyzing this point for-
mally).  
Our discussion of the empirical evidence on housebank relationships in Germany places spe-
cial emphasis on such types of insurance provided by relationship lenders. But before turning 
to the evidence, the “down side” of relationship lending (i.e. its costs) must be mentioned. 
First of all, relationship lending is not a dominant type of financing, since it is inevitably as-
sociated with costs. A potential source of costs for bank financing is that associated with 
monitoring (see e.g. Gale/Hellwig 1985, Diamond 1991). There are also, as already men-
tioned, switching costs involved in relationship lending in the sense of Sharpe (1990) and Ra-
jan (1992). In their models, the information privilege of banks endogenously induces bargain-
ing power, giving rise to a hold-up problem. Hence (additional or exclusive) borrowing from 
arm's-length lenders may be used to limit rents which would be exploitable by informed lend-
ers. Finally, the possibility of contract renegotiation may lead to a kind of “soft-budget con-
straint” for borrowers, where relationship lenders perform anything but efficiently as an insur-  17
ance function. They may be tempted to provide additional financing even though it is ineffi-
cient. This in turn may adversely affect the incentives of the borrower to avoid bad outcomes 
ex ante (see Dewatripont/Maskin 1995). 
To conclude, our brief discussion of the theory of relationship lending illustrates the complex-
ity of this financial arrangement. Using relationship lending, or housebanks, for corporate 
financing can benefit firms, but relationship lending has negative aspects as well. This high-
lights the necessity of looking at empirical evidence in order to learn more about universal 
banks in Germany and their relationship with firms. Evidence on the existence of housebanks 
also directly addresses the question whether or not the housebank institution exists in the first 
place. Only recently, Edwards/Fischer (1994) have argued that housebanks in Germany are a 
myth (see the quotation at the beginning of this chapter). We will show in this subsection that 
their claim is mistaken, and we will show in the following sections that the existence of 
housebanks does in fact have real effects on firm financing patterns.  
 
3.2  Characteristics of a Housebank 
Although the notion of the housebank is very well known in Germany in general, the exact 
characteristics of this institution are rather ambiguous. A recent study by Elsas (2003) can 
shed some light on this issue. 
The author provides an empirical analysis of the determinants of the housebank status of five 
German universal banks with respect to a given sample of corporate borrowers. The analysis 
is based on an exogenous criterion for a bank’s housebank status, sampled in 1997, that is  the 
self-assessment of banks regarding their own status. For the underlying firm sample, respon-
sible credit officers at the banks were asked to assess and comply with the following: i) Is 
your bank the housebank of the given customer, yes or no? and ii) Please provide a written 
explanation of your assessment. The firm sample itself consists of 200 borrowers randomly 
drawn from the population of all corporate borrowers of the banks, meeting specific selection    18
criteria with respect to size, debt structure and the location of their headquarters.15 The banks 
from which the firm observations originate are Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Bayerische 
Vereinsbank (now HypoVereinsbank), DG Bank (now DZ-Bank), and WestLB. All of these 
banks are universal banks with corporate credit business and belong to the top ten banks in 
Germany with respect to size and market share. The first three banks are for-profit private 
banks, while DG-Bank is the apex institution of the cooperatives sector. WestLB is the largest 
apex bank of the public savings banks sector. Hence the sample of banks represents all rele-
vant sectors of the German banking system. 
Table 3 shows the major results of the analysis of written responses by the banks with respect 
to their housebank status. In column 1, the table contains a definition of categories used to 
classify the written responses. For example, the second category is attributed to all responses 
indicating that the bank has a high share in payment transactions of its borrower. Judged by 
the frequency with which a given factor is mentioned, it turns out that banks explained the 
incidence (or absence) of their housebank status primarily using nine factors. If a bank i) has a 
high share in debt financing, ii) has a high share in payment transactions, iii), iv) has a high 
share in either long-term or short-term financing, v), vi), vii) undertakes special, exclusive or 
intense business with the firm, viii) the duration of the bank-borrower relationship is long, or 
ix) has influence on the firm's management, then a housebank relationship is more likely to be 
observed.  
                                                 
15   Note that the response rate of the survey was 97.5% (i.e. 195 observations), which is extremely high. This is 
due to the fact that the survey was conducted within a large-scale joint research project of the banks and 
five academic research teams, where an analysis of credit-management processes in Germany was con-
ducted. See Elsas et al. (1998) for details.   19
Table 3: Categories of Responses on the Housebank Status of Banks 
Factor definition („the bank has...“) Mentioning  Frequencies 
  if the bank viewed 
itself not as 
housebank 
if the bank 
viewed itself 
as housebank 
total (out of 
195 observa-
tions) 
High share in debt financing  38  48  86 
High share in payment transactions  28  38  66 
High share in short-term financing  11  22  33 
High share in long-term financing  7  23   30 
High business intensity  15  14  29 
Exclusive business  11  18  29  
Provides special services  11  14  25 
Long duration  6  18  24 
Influence on the management  1  21  22 
Note. Source: Elsas (2003), Table 1, p. 9.  
 
By relating the banks’ self-assessments to observed loan contract and borrower characteris-
tics, the author further shows that: 
 Relationship lending is systematically associated with a high share of a bank in the 
total financing of the borrower. 
 Firms within a housebank relationship maintain a significantly lower number of 
simultaneous bank relationships. 
 In keeping with the theoretical concept, relationship lending serves as a financing 
instrument intended to create bargaining power for the bank involved, thereby 
leading to a commitment between the two contracting parties. 
The first two results can be illustrated by some descriptive statistics. Based on the same data 
set, Elsas/Krahnen (1998) report descriptive statistics for housebank and arm’s-length bor-
rowers related to contractual and borrower characteristics. A selection is shown in table 4.   20
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Borrowers with and without a Housebank Relationship 
Variable housebank  not  housebank 
Number of bank relationships   4.8  8.5 
Duration of bank-borrower relationship [years]  23.1  25.3 
Share in debt financing held by reporting bank [%] 46.0  26.0 
Bank internal rating  2.8  3.3 
Limited liability [% of all borrowers]  84.0  78.0 
Size [sales in million Euro]  84.5  104.5 
Number of observations  32  23 
Calculations are based on observations from 1996. The housebank attribution is based on the self-
assessments of loan officers combined with evidence from the credit files. Bank internal ratings are meas-
ured on a scale of 1 to 6, where category 1 indicates highest loan quality (lowest default probability) and 6 
indicates worst loan quality, typically in default. 
Source: Elsas/Krahnen (1998), p. 1296, Table 3. 
 
To conclude, on the basis of the SME-sample used in Elsas/Krahnen 1998 and Elsas (2003), 
the observed characteristics of housebank relationships are consistent with the theory of rela-
tionship lending.  
 
4   Banks as Financiers of Small and Medium Enterprises: Intertemporal Smoothing, Li-
quidity Insurance, and Credit Availability  
4.1   Overview 
As outlined above, commitment between two contracting parties allows a contemporaneous 
competitive pricing restriction to be abandoned since it introduces monopoly power into the 
credit relationship. The most obvious benefit is that this enables intertemporal transfers. For 
example, if the borrower is tied to the bank, the bank may charge interest rates on loans below 
the competitive level at the beginning of the relationship, knowing that it will be able to ex-
tract rents at a later stage (i.e., the bank will then be able to charge interest rates higher than 
the competitive level).    21
This section discusses some evidence on three specific issues associated with intertemporal 
contracting by relationship lenders. The first issue is concerned with the actual adjustment of 
interest rates charged on lines of credit to corporate borrowers who are classified as either a 
housebank or non-housebank customer. The second issue addresses the potential insurance 
function of relationship lenders by discussing liquidity insurance provided by housebanks. 
The third issue is concerned with Petersen/Rajan’s (1995) conjecture that intertemporal con-
tracting due to relationship lending may increase the availability of credit to borrowers.  
 
4.2   Evidence on Loan Pricing 
Using the same data as in the previous section, Elsas/Krahnen (1998) and Elsas (2001) ana-
lyze the loan pricing of banks between housebank and arm’s-length relationships. The authors 
postulate that there will be differences in pricing patterns for two reasons: firstly because rela-
tionship lenders conduct interest rate smoothing for their borrowers, as suggested by Ber-
lin/Mester (1999), and secondly because of remuneration of housebank-specific services (like 
information production, distress insurance etc.) or monopoly rents which contribute to ob-
served prices. 
Elsas/Krahnen (1998) investigate the spreads charged by banks on lines of credits. Following 
the literature (see e.g. Berger/Udell (1995)), it is appropriate to look at the pricing of lines of 
credit since in general banks have considerable freedom in price setting for these types of 
loan. Lines of credit serve as a means for providing firms with liquidity at short notice and 
(typically) do not have a fixed maturity or a tie to some specific investment project financed 
by the loan.16 Moreover, in Germany, lines of credit provide banks with the right to set inter-
est rates almost at their discretion. Most of the loans are not linked to a reference rate (like for 
example the LIBOR), and no fixed spread is contractually pre-specified. Hence the pricing of 
lines of credit seems particularly interesting with regard to learning about the price setting 
behavior of banks.17 
                                                 
16   In Germany, lines of credit are usually provided in conjunction with checking accounts and therefore re-
semble overdraft facilities. 
17   This is the standard approach in the literature, see e.g. Petersen/Rajan (1994, 1995), Berger/Udell (1995) for 
the US, Degryse/van Cayseele (2000) for Belgian and Harhoff/Körting (1998) for German firms (and a 
sample with small scale industry).   22
In terms of methodology, cross-sectional regressions of the interest rate spread on a set of 
explanatory variables are used.18 The empirical model consists of control variables (like firm 
size, legal status), and a dummy variable indicating whether or not the borrower is involved in 
a housebank relationship. The dummy variable proxying for the housebank status of a particu-
lar lender captures the extent to which the housebank status shifts the regression function for 
housebank borrrowers. This shift is positive if housebanks charge on average a positive pre-
mium, and negative if they price on average below the competitive level relevant for the non-
housebank borrowers. 
Table 5: Determinants of Interest Rates Charged on Lines of Credit 
Regressors Dependant:  Interest Rate Spread on 
Lines of Credit 
1996 
Constant 6.96  (0.00)*** 
Firm size  -0.24 (0.01)*** 
Rating 3 (medium default risk)  0.40 (0.06)* 
Rating 4   0.60 (0.01)*** 
Rating 5 ((high default risk)  0.94 (0.06)* 
HB   -0.28 (0.15) 
No. of Observations  83 
adj. R
2 0.32 
Note: Summary of results as reported in Elsas/Krahnen (1998), p. 1302, Table 5. All 
observations are from 1996. HB is a dummy variable, taking the value of one if, 
according to the lender, it is a housebank relationship. Rating classes 1 and 2 are 
taken together and serve as the benchmark. P-values are in parentheses. *** indi-
cates significance at the 1%-level. 
 
As can be seen from table 5, interest rates charged on lines of credit are significantly sensitive 
to borrower default risk. However, the magnitude of the risk premium is quite small. Evalu-
ated at the sample mean, it amounts to 94 basis points (above the reference rate, FIBOR). The 
comparative spread on the market for corporate bonds in 1996 averaged roughly @XYZ basis 
points.19 Even more interestingly, the coefficient of the housebank dummy turns out to be 
                                                 
18   The spread on the amount outstanding is defined as the interest rate charged by the bank minus the 3-month 
FIBOR (Frankfurt Interbank Offered Rate). 
19   These numbers have to be interpreted with care. First, the corporate bond market in Germany 1996 was 
quite small, by American standards. Second, the calibration of internal ratings and external ratings is guess   23
insignificant. This suggests that on average there is no difference in price setting between 
housebank and arm’s-length customers.  This observation is at variance with some of the lit-
erature (see e.g. Berger/Udell 1995 and Degryse/van Cayseele 2000). There are at least three 
rational explanations for this result: i) housebanks do not provide services any more valuable 
than those of arm’s-length banks, ii) different patterns of intertemporal transfers cancel out in 
the cross-section of borrowers, and iii) adjusting interest rates is not the only way to remuner-
ate housebank services, i.e. the analysis ignores the cross-selling issue and other non-spread 
income components. Unfortunately, it is a unifying feature (or caveat) of all existing empirical 
studies on relationship lending and loan pricing issues that due to lack of data it has not yet 
been possible to differentiate empirically between these explanations. 
Elsas (2001) augments this analysis by using the same data within a panel framework, includ-
ing the interest rate level, and an interaction term between the interest rate level and the 
housebank dummy. The interest rate level is included because interest rate adjustments by 
banks are known to be sticky in general and dependent on the interest rate level (see e.g. Ber-
ger/Udell (1992) for the US and Deutsche Bundesbank (1996) for Germany). The interaction 
term is the actual measure of a different pattern of intertemporal smoothing by housebanks. It 
turns out that spreads on lines of credit systematically vary in magnitude with the aggregate 
level of interest rates. However, the coefficient for the interaction term is insignificant, sug-
gesting that housebanks do not differ from arm’s-length banks with respect to their degree of 
interest rate smoothing. 
 
4.3 Liquidity  Insurance   
Elsas/Krahnen (1998) also look at whether housebanks provide liquidity insurance for bor-
rowers. They analyze loan contract adjustments as a function of changes in borrower quality. 
An insurance function of relationship lenders implies that the lending behavior of housebanks 
                                                                                                                                                          
work here. We interpreted an internal rating of 1 and 2, the benchmark as an A, and a rating of 5 as a B. 
This is a conservative estimate in the sense that it almost surely underestimates the differences in default 
probabilities among these internal rating classes. Even if we recall the small size of our sample, the ob-
served price differential between bond market and loan market is disturbing, as a spread of 94 basis points 
can hardly be reconciled with earning positive profits in the loan business.    24
will differ systematically from that of arm’s-length lenders. This should be particularly appar-
ent in the case of a quality deterioration. 
The main hypothesis states that owing to the properties of relationship lending, housebanks 
will increase (or at least not reduce) their loan supply if borrower quality deteriorates. Arm’s-
length banks, in contrast, will reduce funding under these circumstances. The supporting role 
of housebanks in the event of a quality deterioration can be interpreted as a liquidity insur-
ance. To test the hypothesis, Elsas/Krahnen (1998) regress changes in credit volume on con-
temporaneous changes of internal ratings, i.e. the banks’ assessment of borrower quality. The 
adjustment rate of loan supply is further differentiated by the housebank status. The results 
reported in Elsas/Krahnen (1998) support the claim that the availability of credit to firms in 
financial trouble is improved by relationship lending. To be specific, given a one-rating-notch 
deterioration of borrower quality, housebanks increase their loan supply, while arm’s-length 
lenders do not. Thus housebanks offer liquidity insurance to their clients. The insurance of-
fered is not unconditional, however, as it is shown to depend on the magnitude of the change 
in quality. If the increase in default probability is large, implying a deterioration by two or 
more notches, all banks will decrease their financial commitment, irrespective of the house-
bank status. Elsas/Krahnen (1998) argue that liquidity insurance is an important real effect of 
relationship lending because its anticipation by firms is likely to have an impact on the entire 
financing structure of these firms. We therefore believe that liquidity insurance is an impor-
tant attribute of a housebank system. Furthermore, the identification of liquidity insurance as a 
common outcome of close bank-firm relations suggests that housebanking is indeed economi-
cally relevant and not just some myth.  
 
4.4  Credit Rationing  
Credit rationing is an economic phenomenon typically associated with problems of informa-
tion asymmetries or incomplete contracting in debt markets. According to Baltensperger 
(1978) and Keeton (1979), equilibrium credit rationing occurs if a borrower’s demand for 
credit is denied, even if this borrower is willing to pay all the price and non-price elements of 
a loan contract (see also Freixas/Rochet (1997), p. 137). Obviously, this definition includes 
the interest rate charged on the loan and contract features such as collateralization or cove-
nants.   25
Relationship lending may have an impact on credit rationing. Again, the basic idea is that re-
lying on a relationship lender may enhance credit availability since this lender i) already has 
better (private) information, ii) may have better incentives to engage in costly information 
production, and iii) may extract rents from the relationship with the borrower in the future.  
Fischer's study (2000) provides unique insights in to the role of information accumulation by 
banks (the essential feature of relationship lending) and credit rationing. It is concerned with 
incentives encouraging banks to engage in costly information production and the role played 
by competition in this context. Using data from a questionnaire, Fischer (2000) observes in-
formation flows from the borrowers to banks within a loan application situation.20  
In a first step, the author analyzes the impact of bank competition in local debt markets on the 
degree of information acquisition by banks. It turns out that banks in more concentrated local 
debt markets engage significantly more in information acquisition than banks in more com-
petitive environments. Since relationship lending can be interpreted as being based on infor-
mation accumulation and being rationally intended for the creation of monopoly power within 
credit relationships (see Elsas 2003), these results carry over directly to the housebank case. 
The next step considers firm behavior with respect to taking discounts offered by suppliers, in 
other words trade credit. The frequency of not taking supplier discounts often serves as a 
proxy for credit rationing since it is presumed to be the most expensive source of financing 
for firms.21 The effect of relationship lending on credit availability can be tested by the impact 
of bank concentration in local debt markets on the frequency of firms taking discounts. The 
underlying idea is that the exogenous monopoly power of banks in credit relationships (i.e., 
bank concentration) has the same impact on financing restrictions for firms as does endoge-
nous monopoly power arising from relationship lending (see Petersen/Rajan 1995). Since the 
results imply that banks in more concentrated markets do indeed invest more in information 
production and monitoring, it can be expected that firms located in those markets will be less 
financially constrained. 
                                                 
20   The data set was provided by the Ifo-Institute (Institute for Economic Research), a leading research institu-
tion in Germany. The Ifo Institute conducted a survey on Corporate Finance in 1997, by sending a ques-
tionnaire all firms that regularly participate in their yearly survey of firm investments. 
21   It is argued that not taking discounts offered by suppliers indicates financial constraints because of the high 
opportunity cost of doing so (see e.g. Petersen/Rajan (1995)).   26
The analysis is conducted in the following way. The ordinal variable “frequency of taking 
discounts”, indicating the ordered items “never / rarely / frequently / always”, is regressed on 
a set of explanatory variables. These consist of control variables for firm heterogeneity such 
as firm size, profitability, financial leverage, and so forth. 
The coefficient of the main variable of interest, a Herfindahl-index of bank concentration in 
local debt markets,22 is positive and significantly different from zero. Hence, the higher the 
bank concentration in local debt markets, the more often firms will make use of discounts 
offered by suppliers. In other words, the higher the concentration, the less firms will use ex-
pensive trade credit. Fischer’s evidence is consistent with the notion of relationship lending as 
a means by which to increase credit availability. This finding is similar to the results of Peter-
sen/Rajan (1995) for US firms, albeit that Fischer (2000) offers another explanation for this 
pattern, namely the value of accumulated private information. 
However, it is questionable whether the frequency of taking supplier discounts is indeed a 
good proxy for the existence of credit rationing, since the opportunity costs decrease the 
longer actual payment of a bill is postponed (see Petersen/Rajan 1997 for an extensive discus-
sion of trade credit). However, a study by Plötscher (2001), using  the same data underlying 
Fischer’s results, finds that firms which use trade credit less frequently were indeed denied 
credit by their bank.23  
To conclude, the previous results constitute evidence that housebank relationships do  in fact 
confer economic benefits consistent with the theoretical concept of relationship lending. El-
sas’ (2003) findings indicate that the building block of relationship lending (or housebank 
relations) is the intended creation of monopoly power in credit relationships. Fischer (2000) 
shows that monopoly power indeed affects incentives to engage in costly monitoring and in-
formation production, with intuitively plausible consequences for credit availability.   
                                                 
22   The Herfindahl-index is a common measure of concentration and defined as the sum of squared market 
shares of each individual economic entity present in the market. It accounts for the number of market par-
ticipants as wells as asymmetry between their individual market shares.  
23   Another caveat goes back to Wilner (2000), who argues that customer relations between firms and suppliers 
exhibit characteristics similar to relationship lending if there is some commitment between the two (e.g. ow-
ing to the specificity of the suppliers products). Hence, if the remuneration of supply also reflects premia for 
insurance-like services or intertemporal smoothing, it is difficult to judge pricing just by looking at interest 
rates at one point in time.   27
The analysis by Elsas/Krahnen (1998) is closely related to intertemporal smoothing and the 
issue of credit availability. As already described in more detail, their findings suggests an im-
portant role for relationship lending in the provision of liquidity insurance. The following 
section will discuss complementary evidence on the special role of housebanks when their 
client firms actually are in financial distress. 
 
5  Banks as Financiers of Small and Medium Enterprises: Borrower Distress, 
Reorganization, and Liquidation 
5.1 Introduction 
So far we have seen that housebanks provide financial insurance in the case of single notch 
rating migrations, which are interpreted  temporary, or mild deterioration of borrower quality. 
We will now turn to the case of migrations to junk ratings, that is a serious deterioration of 
borrower quality. In these cases borrowers are considered to be in financial distress, and 
banks prepare themselves for workout, liquidation, or court action. Administrative responsi-
bilities within the banks typically shift to specialized workout departments.  
The involvement of banks in the reorganization of distressed borrowers is greatly facilitated 
by the structure of the German insolvency code. This is true for the old code, the Konkurs- 
und Vergleichsordnung which was effective between 1877 and 1999, and it is still true for the 
new code, the Insolvenzordnung, albeit to a lesser degree. The new code was motivated 
largely by an alleged liquidation bias of the old code. Despite this criticism, advocated mostly 
by legal scholars, there is little empirical evidence available to support this claim. The fre-
quently cited 0.5% of all cases which enter the court-supervised reorganization proceedings 
(Vergleichsverfahren), while the remaining 99.5% enter into bankruptcy proceedings 
(Konkursverfahren24), do not support the claim because these numbers abstract from all those 
instances in which an attempt is made to reorganize a distressed firm prior to court interven-
tion.25 In a statistical sense, the concentration on all cases that enter the court-supervised 
                                                 
24   Konkursverfahren is sometimes translated as compulsory liquidation even though liquidation is not manda-
tory. For reasons of clarity we will adhere to the following terminology:  Vergleichsordnung as reorganiza-
tion proceedings and Konkursordnung as bankruptcy proceedings. 
25   See for these numbers Friderichs/Paranque/Sauvé (1999), p. 76. The same authors provide a survey of the   28
process, be it for bankruptcy or reorganization proceedings, rather than all cases that reach a 
certain level of default probability, constitutes a sampling bias. The bias stems from the ex-
clusion of all firms that have a significant default probability, i.e. are near-insolvent, but are 
privately restructured. Clearly, conclusions drawn from a biased sample cannot be generalized 
to the population.  
Figure 1 is a sketch of the procedural logic of the former German insolvency code, the 
Konkurs- und Vergleichsordnung (in effect until 1.1.1999). The shaded area in figure 1 refers 
to those cases that enter court proceedings, defining the biased sample referred to above. This 
area captures only a subset of all distress cases.26  
To evaluate the merits of the old and the new German insolvency code it is instructive to re-
call the timing of decisions by firm management, creditors and the court in a typical distress 
situation. Figure 1 presents such a sequence, starting from an unexpected event that causes 
financial distress, followed by an upward adjustment of default expectation by the lender (T1), 
and a decision by the lenders concerning a possible private reorganization (T2,3). If this deci-
sion is negative, court proceedings will be started, leading either to composition proceedings 
or compulsory liquidation (T4). If the decision is positive and if the private reorganization 
involving creditors is successful, the firm will reappear as a healthy business unit (continua-
tion). On the other hand, if the reorganization is not successful, the company will enter formal 
court proceedings (T4).   
 
                                                                                                                                                          
old German insolvency code.  
26   Note further that 70% of all cases entering bankruptcy proceedings were dismissed for lack of assets, see 
Friderichs/Paranque/Sauvé (1999), p. 76.   29
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The outcome of this consideration is that in order to measure the impact of a given insolvency 
code on the decision to liquidate or to reorganize a company, the corresponding efforts of 
creditors prior to court proceedings must also be taken into account. Working with a sample 
of 124 medium-sized German distressed borrowers, Brunner/Krahnen (2002) report that of 
the 18 firms entering court proceedings, none emerged as a healthy entity, 50% were liqui-
dated, and the remaining 50% were still pending. However, the vast majority of all cases, 85% 
(106 cases), were in fact reorganized. 16% (18 cases) were successfully reorganized, 88 cases 
were still pending due to the long duration of the workouts.27 Attempts to reorganize dis-
tressed borrowers are therefore very common in German financial markets as far as medium 
sized industry is concerned.  
In order to better understand why lending institutions are willing to become involved in out-
of-court restructurings, we will delineate the German insolvency code in the next subsection 
(5.2), before presenting some evidence on the role of housebanks in workout decision-making 
(5.3). Subsection 5.4 will deal with multiple lending and the inherent risk of inefficient and 
premature liquidations. We will ask how the risk of a run on firm assets is mitigated. Our 
analysis centers on an effective institution in the German banking world, the so-called bank 
                                                 
27   The underlying data set is an extension of the one used by Elsas/Krahnen (1998) and Elsas (2003), see Sec-
tion 4 of this chapter.   30
pool. This institution appears to be fairly successful in organizing collaborative action be-
tween several banks at the onset of financial distress.  
 
5.2  German Insolvency Code: Old and New  
The current German insolvency code was enacted on January 1, 1999.28 It was intended to 
improve the old code by allowing an early commencement of court proceedings and by pro-
viding incentives for timely reorganization. To this end, imminent illiquidity has been defined 
as a new bankruptcy trigger. The new code supplements the two provisions of the old code 
relating to factual illiquidity and overindebtedness (i.e., when asset value is smaller than debt 
value). Thus, the borrower can ask for protection under the new bankruptcy code if he expects 
illiquidity to materialize. For a period of three months there will be an automatic stay with 
respect to all secured claims. The borrower or the insolvency administrator must present an 
insolvency plan to the court. This plan must be supported by a majority of lenders (by heads 
and by amounts) in the creditors committee, and a distinction must be made for each class of 
claims (secured, unsecured, unsecured junior, employees, small/trade creditors).  
Under specified circumstances, the court can overrule the voting of the creditor classes, in 
order to minimize the risk of strategic voting. Small creditors are protected by a Pareto princi-
ple, i.e., minority creditors must not receive less than they would if there were no insolvency 
plan in the first place. The law does not impose details on the restructuring effort, but rather 
invites innovations in the reorganization efforts. Pre-insolvency claims, in particular collateral 
rights, are respected under the insolvency plan. In addition, secured creditors have special 
information rights during the insolvency proceedings, and they have a right of preemption for 
secured assets sold.   
Overall, the new insolvency code is a blend between the old, creditor-friendly legislation and 
a US-style, debtor-oriented code. It allows for considerable flexibility with regard to possible 
arrangements among creditors. Until 1998, the old insolvency code allowed only factual illiq-
uidity and overindebtedness as commencement facts for court-supervised bankruptcy pro-
                                                 
28    See Kaiser (1996), Franks/Nyborg/Torous (1996), Drukarczyk 1999 and Schmidt (1980) for additional 
details on the institutional features presented in this section.   31
ceedings. These proceedings could take one of two routes: bankruptcy proceedings and reor-
ganization proceedings. In both cases, control was shifted from the (owner-) manager to an 
official receiver who was empowered and supervised by the courts. There was no automatic 
stay, since secured creditors were free to take legal action individually in order to secure their 
claim.29 Table 6 summarizes the key characteristics of the old and the new codes.  
Table 6: Key Characteristics of the Old and New German Insolvency Code 
Characteristics of code  New code  
(since Jan. 1, 1999) 
Old code  
(until Dec.31, 1998) 
Bankruptcy commencement 
(court proceedings) due to 
 Overindebtedness 
 Factual insolvency 
 Imminent insolvency 
(only debtor) 
 Overindebtedness 
 Factual insolvency 
 
Insolvency plan?  Yes, consent by majority of 
all claimholder classes re-
quired 
Not required outside formal 
bankruptcy proceedings 
Automatic stay?  Yes, if protection under bank-
ruptcy law is sought 
No 
Minority creditor protection?  Yes, insolvency plan must 
Pareto improve on current 
situation 
No 
Collateral rights?  Are respected throughout  Are respected throughout 
Seniority of new funds pro-
vided within the scope of the 
insolvency procedure? 
No fixed rule, negotiable 
within the limits of the insol-
vency plan 
No 
 
5.2  Workout Involvement by Housebanks    
We now turn to the decision of creditors to support workout activities prior to any court su-
pervised formal bankruptcy proceedings. We shall try to shed light on two aspects of bank 
behavior, i.e. the involvement of lenders in pre-bankruptcy restructuring of distressed firms, 
and the role of housebanks in these situations.  
                                                 
29   The strong creditor position in bankruptcy proceedings under the old code was  facilitated in particular by 
the secured lenders' rights of separation (Aussonderung) and separate satisfaction from the assets (Abson-
derung).    32
The first question to be asked is whether banks get involved in the restructuring of firms to 
whom they have lent money and who they judge to be in distress? Using the credit-file data 
already introduced in section 4, Elsas/Krahnen (2002) analyze a sample of 62 potentially dis-
tressed lending relationships, 21% of which involve housebanks, while the rest relate to 
arm’s-length banks.30  
Remarkably, only 6.5% of all cases go straight into bankruptcy proceedings, either compul-
sory liquidation or composition proceedings. 37% of all cases report a serious attempt at reor-
ganization with bank participation. If such a workout occurs, bank participation includes the 
provision of fresh money, the initiation of management consulting and, in some cases, direct 
management involvement by the lending institution. The remaining 56.5 % experience no 
special workout treatment. Thus, formal insolvency proceedings (the lower right hand section 
of figure 1) with respect to the sample of medium-sized German companies capture only a 
very minor portion of all bank involvement in distressed firms. The prominence of lender in-
volvement in pre-bankruptcy reorganization and restructuring is quite considerable by com-
parison with that of other countries, such as the UK (see Franks/Sussman 2000) or the US 
(see Gilson, John, Lang 1990).  
When attempting to predict the role of housebanks in a situation of borrower financial dis-
tress, it is useful to view the decision of a bank to participate in a workout as being a funda-
mental investment decision. In many cases restructuring will not be possible unless additional 
funds are provided. The outcome thus depends on whether an additional investment is a posi-
tive net present value project. Each bank among the company’s creditors will have to evaluate 
the present value of an extended financial commitment vis-à-vis the company. If this present 
value is positive, the required workout can be undertaken, otherwise the bank will not be will-
ing to extend additional loans, or to take any other supportive action. Instead it will tend to 
pull back and, perhaps, trigger the liquidation of the company. However, strategic interaction 
between lenders as well as between lenders and the borrower may lead to violations of this 
NPV-based efficiency rule. 
                                                 
30   The firms in this sample are a random draw of medium-sized (West-) German companies with at least one 
negative (junk) internal rating during the observation window 1992-1996.  
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Ceteris paribus, supportive actions by a particular lender are more likely (i) the higher the 
seniority of his claims is over the claims of other creditors, (ii) the lower his bargaining costs 
are expected to be  relative to other creditors, and (iii) if his uncertainty in the assessment of 
the real economic value of a debtor’s assets is regarded as being low. The first two conditions 
refer to the free-riding problem that emerges in a borrower distress situation with multiple 
lenders (Wruck 1990, Gilson/John/Lang 1990). Relationship lending and the accumulation of 
collateral can be seen as being complementary in view of solving this free-riding problem. 
Relationship lending is associated with an instrumental role of the bank in total firm financ-
ing, which provides bargaining power against other lenders and against the borrower. Since 
collateral affects the seniority of lenders,31 the allocation of collateral determines bargaining 
power within the group of all lenders as well. That collateral thereby reduces conflicts among 
lenders in distress situations, is a hypothesis developed by Longhofer/Santos (2000) and 
Welch (1997).32 Therefore, it is conclusive to note that according to Elsas/Krahnen (2002), 
housebanks are systematically more collateralized (more senior) than other banks.  
The third condition regarding information on the borrower’s business is especially true for 
those lenders with private information. Hence, all three conditions are met by relationship 
lenders, and it is therefore to be expected that these institutions will engage more frequently in 
workouts than normal lenders. 
A closer look at the workout-decision-by-creditors node in figure 1 is therefore justified in 
order to understand the determinants of bank involvement in corporate restructuring. To test 
this hypothesis Elsas/Krahnen (2002) run a probit regression where the binary dependent 
variable takes the value of one if any workout activity by a sample bank (such as providing 
fresh money, developing a restructuring plan, or pressing the board to replace management) is 
observed, and otherwise zero. The estimation identifies two primary significant explanatory 
variables which are robust across a variety of models. The first is the proportion of collateral-
ized loans of total loans. The coefficient is positive, indicating that ceteris paribus more col-
                                                 
31   According to the study by Elsas/Krahnen (2002), the majority of all collateral rights contractually agreed 
upon in the loan contracts of their sample correspond to inside collateral, i.e. collateral that reallocates the 
seniority of lenders claims rather than extending the aggregate adhesive wealth liable for all lenders (outside 
collateral). 
32   In the German literature, this conflict reducing role of collateral has been discussed since 1980, see for 
example Schmidt (1980) and Rudolph (1984).   34
lateral (here: a higher seniority) increases the likelihood of active workout involvement by the 
banks.  
The second significant variable is the housebank dummy variable, which takes the value of 
one if a particular bank is the housebank or the relationship lender of the company, and zero 
otherwise. The housebank dummy has a positive coefficient in the regression which is again 
robust across different model specifications. The interpretation here is that during a period of 
distress housebanks are more willing than arm’s-length banks to engage in workout activities. 
Taken together, these results support the hypothesis that housebanks play an active role in 
pre-bankruptcy corporate reorganization.  
The above findings suggest that relationship lenders are typically major and senior lenders, 
presumably equipped with information privileges and, therefore, bargaining power against 
other lenders and the borrower. This combination increases their willingness to engage in a 
costly workout. 
Since multiple lending is common in Germany, workouts and out-of-court reorganizations 
face problems of coordination among lenders, and of free rider incentives. The next section 
reports how these problems can be overcome.  
 
5.3  Multiple Lending and Pre-bankruptcy Workouts: How to Overcome  
Free-rider Incentives 
The non-shaded area in figure 1 describes an aspect of lending relationships that is frequently 
disregarded when corporate distress and the insolvency code are discussed. The pre-
bankruptcy involvement of banks in corporate reorganizations seems to be a common phe-
nomenon in Germany, however. Housebanks in particular are prepared to take action in dis-
tress times, i.e. to provide fresh money, request the advice of outside consultants, increase 
pressure by frequent monitoring etc., in order to support firm workout activities. In light of 
the typical debt structure of firms in Germany, i.e., in most cases bank debt with multiple 
lenders, questions arise about how pre-bankruptcy involvement by banks can be sustained and 
the risk of a corporate run (a preemptive loan cancellation) be avoided.    35
Brunner/Krahnen (2002) have studied these issues. Their data set is an augmented version of 
the one used by Elsas/Krahnen (2002), containing detailed information on bank activities in 
corporate distress for 124 relationships over a 5-7 years period (observation period 1992-
1999).   
Their major finding relates to an institution that for a long time was overlooked by financial 
economists when studying the German financial system, namely the bank pool. These pools 
play an instrumental role in explaining both the success of bank involvement in pre-
bankruptcy corporate workouts and the apparent absence of bank involvement in formal bank-
ruptcy proceedings. 
For the sample analyzed by Brunner/Krahnen (2002), in 47% of all cases a bank pool was 
formed, typically at or shortly before the onset of borrower distress. The formation of a bank 
pool is more likely if the distress event is considered to be serious. For firms with a serious 
distress rating,33 70% will turn to a bank pool, while for the less serious distress rating this 
number is only 42%. 
The institutional details of these pools follow a common contractual structure, which is in-
tended to align the incentives of creditors and to hinder unilateral debt enforcement (which is 
always possible under the German law, particularly for secured creditors). Furthermore, bank 
pools coordinate lender involvement by nominating one pool leader as a trustee. Pools are 
typically formed when illiquidity of the borrower is expected by one lender. A formal pool 
agreement is signed that includes all banks and, in exceptional cases, trade creditors as well. 
The agreement covers the outstanding non-collateralized debt of each bank, for which the 
pool then seeks collateral coverage. Thus, most pool member banks have additional collateral 
outside the pool, which was signed before pool formation. A stand-still agreement between all 
member banks guarantees that they will liquidate their collateral only with the consent of the 
pool. The shares of non-collateralized debt are the basis for determining individual pool-
quotas. The bank with the largest quota becomes the pool leader. Of course, this is not neces-
sarily the bank with the largest loan outstanding. Future in- and outflows of cash are then 
                                                 
33   Again, bank internal ratings are measured on a six category scale, where categories 5 and 6 (highest default 
risks or actual default) are interpreted as expected or actual distress, see Brunner/Krahnen (2002).  
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shared among pool members according to their quotas. Decision-making within the pool must 
be unanimous; members can leave the pool, but the contract makes it unattractive to do so. 
What effect has pool formation on the success probability of a workout? To answer this ques-
tion Brunner/Krahnen (2002) define workout success as a significant lowering of the default 
probability, proxied by an improvement of internal ratings from junk to investment grade. 
Workout success is then regressed on a number of explanatory variables. It turns out that the 
existence of a bank pool increases the probability of success (presumably because of its inter-
est alignment function), while the number of bank relations, given that a pool exists, has a 
negative impact on this probability. The latter finding suggests that even bank pools are not 
able to completely resolve the coordination problems inherent in financial distress. These de-
terminants of workout success are robust under various specifications of the basic model.  
A further test concerns the determinants of pool formation. The regression analysis reveals 
that for a particular firm in distress, pool formation is more likely when the number of banks 
involved is intermediate (3 to 7), and when the loans outstanding have approximately the 
same size among all lenders (are not too unequal among lenders).  
Referring once again to figure 1, the evidence suggests that bank involvement in corporate 
restructuring in Germany is particularly strong in the period preceding formal bankruptcy 
proceedings. Housebanks play a special role in these times as they tend to accumulate collat-
eral and emerge as the major monitor. They are typically not fully collateralized, so proper 
monitoring and workout incentives are upheld. Bank pools are an effective workout device, 
much in use among medium-size distressed borrowers. As was argued above, this may be due 
to the fact that the German insolvency code (both the old and the new) respects creditor rights 
in its proceedings.  
 
6  The Housebank: Myth, Reality, and the Future  
This chapter has reviewed recent evidence on the role of relationship lending in Germany. As 
a first step, we analyzed close ties between banks and large industrial firms. This involved all 
the features usually regarded as instruments used by banks for influencing the management 
decisions of firms, i.e. debt provision, direct equity stakes, proxy-voting rights and supervi-
sory board representation. The evidence reviewed shows that there is some support for a role   37
of banks in corporate control exercised via equity held in their own right. The evidence fur-
ther indicates that supervisory board representation appears to be caused by equity holdings, 
rather than constituting a control mechanism on its own. Finally, contrary to the common pre-
sumption in the literature, the available evidence does not suggest that banks use proxy-voting 
rights in a systematic way to influence management decisions. This might be due to the fact 
that the exercise of proxy-voting rights is complex because of inherent free-rider and coordi-
nation problems. 
We then turned to the major firm segment of small and medium-sized firms. Here, bank-firm 
relationships mainly result from the provision of debt, a structure analyzed theoretically under 
the notion of relationship lending. In particular, we found support for the idea that housebanks 
develop an informationally intense relationship with their customers, and that these special 
relationships are common among mid-sized firms. Housebank relationships have real conse-
quences. They provide access to funds after rating downgrades, when normal banks tend to 
reduce their loans. Furthermore, in distress situations housebanks are more likely to become 
involved in workout activities. Thus, in the light of the results reported on liquidity insurance 
and workout involvement, some earlier assessments in the literature (e.g. by Edwards/Fischer 
(1994)) were not confirmed. 
Typically, workouts are engineered prior to any court involvement, while hopeless cases are 
handed over to formal bankruptcy proceedings. This explains why court proceedings almost 
never lead to workout activities - a fact that some observers have erroneously interpreted as a 
sign of inefficiency of the insolvency code (see Kaiser 1996 or Franks/Nyborg/Tourus 1996, 
p. 86). In fact, pre-bankruptcy workout activities are common. In case of multiple banking, 
workouts are frequently made possible by forming a bank pool, which is an explicit contrac-
tual arrangement between all bank lenders. These pools align lender incentives and allow  
negotiations to be conducted in a coordinated manner.  
Obviously, the available evidence is not sufficient to provide a comprehensive assessment of 
the pro and cons of bank-firm relationships in Germany. In our view,  at least two avenues of 
future research are needed: First, it is still unclear whether the distinct behavior observed for 
relationship lenders in borrower distress improves efficiency. To answer this question, more 
studies on bank behavior in borrower distress are needed, using data which covers the full 
period of firm reorganization. Second, most of the theory on financial intermediation suggests 
that one bank lender is the optimal number of creditors. But then, why do we observe multiple   38
bank relationships as a general pattern and in conjunction with relationship lending? What 
does this imply for the concept of relationship lending, which builds on information monopo-
lies by banks? Currently, theory has not much to say about whether information monopolies 
can be built or sustained under multiple banking. Further, it is unclear whether relationship 
lending may have some merits, especially in the context of multiple bank lending by firms. 
However, we believe that future investigation of German housebank relationships can provide 
interesting insights into these questions. 
Thus, the overall evidence presented in this chapter clearly supports the hypothesis that rela-
tionship lending in Germany is a fact rather than a myth and, more importantly, that it has real 
economic effects on the financing of corporations. From an economic perspective, the evi-
dence corroborates long term relationship investments of banks and their customers. This may 
well be seen as a valuable asset, particularly in the SME-sector. What will happen to this as-
set? The German financial system has entered a transformation phase, driven by growing 
competitive pressure from financial markets. This pressure threatens to undermine the accep-
tance and the viability of financial relationships, both in commercial and in investment bank-
ing. Therefore, in our opinion, the emerging central topic in the finance arena in Germany will 
be the confrontation between established private relationships and emerging public markets 
for financial services. Whatever the outcome of this encounter34 – one should reckon with 
considerable tenacity of the former.    
                                                 
34 This line of thought is taken up at greater length in the concluding chapter of this volume.   39
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